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Arreglar la democracia: por qué el cambio constitucional a menudo no mejora la democracia en,-
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- ¡Cómpralo ya!Arreglar la democracia: por qué el cambio constitucional a menudo no mejora la democracia en,
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N.º de artículo de eBay:186277551866
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Características del artículo
- Estado
- En buen estado
- Notas del vendedor
- “Used book in good condition. Shows typical wear. Quick shipping. Satisfaction guaranteed!”
- Book Title
- Fixing Democracy: Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhan,
- Narrative Type
- Law Enforcement
- Genre
- N/A
- Intended Audience
- N/A
- ISBN
- 9780190868901
- Subject Area
- Political Science
- Publication Name
- Fixing Democracy : Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press, Incorporated
- Item Length
- 6.1 in
- Subject
- Constitutions, History & Theory, General, World / Caribbean & Latin American, Political Ideologies / Democracy
- Publication Year
- 2018
- Type
- Textbook
- Format
- Trade Paperback
- Language
- English
- Item Height
- 0.8 in
- Item Weight
- 14.1 Oz
- Item Width
- 9.1 in
- Number of Pages
- 288 Pages
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Product Identifiers
Publisher
Oxford University Press, Incorporated
ISBN-10
0190868902
ISBN-13
9780190868901
eBay Product ID (ePID)
240441606
Product Key Features
Number of Pages
288 Pages
Publication Name
Fixing Democracy : Why Constitutional Change Often Fails to Enhance Democracy in Latin America
Language
English
Publication Year
2018
Subject
Constitutions, History & Theory, General, World / Caribbean & Latin American, Political Ideologies / Democracy
Type
Textbook
Subject Area
Political Science
Format
Trade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height
0.8 in
Item Weight
14.1 Oz
Item Length
6.1 in
Item Width
9.1 in
Additional Product Features
Intended Audience
Scholarly & Professional
LCCN
2017-035197
Reviews
"Corrales's theory of power asymmetry resonates with the Latin American experience: constitutions are pacts, and their viability and content depend on the initial balance of forces between the president and the opposition. This book is central to emerging debates about the endogenous nature of institutional design." -Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, University of Notre Dame "Javier Corrales's Fixing Democracy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of constitutionalism, presidentialism, democratization and Latin American politics. Corrales argues that power-diffusing constitutions are an asset for democracies and that they are most likely to emerge when there is a relative symmetry of power between incumbents and the opposition. Constitutions that give presidents great powers can pave the way to democratic erosions; they are most likely when presidents have much more power than oppositions." -Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University "Fixing Democracy is an outstanding book on how the constitutional authority of Latin American presidents expands or is constrained, with major implications for the stability of democratic regimes and the troubling tendency for illiberal backsliding. The book speaks to a large literature on the effects of presidential constitutions in Latin America, but goes well beyond it by showing how constitutions themselves are shaped. Corrales's book is a model of theoretical sophistication and mixed-method empirical research. It will have an important impact on how we think about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and, potentially, other regions as well." - Robert Kaufman, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University "This book is an important contribution to the field of neo-institutionalism in comparative politics. It fills a gap in knowledge of the reasons why presidential powers expand or contract in the context of the broader strength of democracy." -- L. M. Barnett, Our Lady of the Lake University, CHOICE, "Corrales's theory of power asymmetry resonates with the Latin American experience: constitutions are pacts, and their viability and content depend on the initial balance of forces between the president and the opposition. This book is central to emerging debates about the endogenous nature of institutional design." -Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, University of Notre Dame"Javier Corrales's Fixing Democracy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of constitutionalism, presidentialism, democratization and Latin American politics. Corrales argues that power-diffusing constitutions are an asset for democracies and that they are most likely to emerge when there is a relative symmetry of power between incumbents and the opposition. Constitutions that give presidents great powers can pave the wayto democratic erosions; they are most likely when presidents have much more power than oppositions." -Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University"Fixing Democracy is an outstanding book on how the constitutional authority of Latin American presidents expands or is constrained, with major implications for the stability of democratic regimes and the troubling tendency for illiberal backsliding. The book speaks to a large literature on the effects of presidential constitutions in Latin America, but goes well beyond it by showing how constitutions themselves are shaped. Corrales's book is a modelof theoretical sophistication and mixed-method empirical research. It will have an important impact on how we think about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and, potentially, other regions aswell." - Robert Kaufman, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University"This book is an important contribution to the field of neo-institutionalism in comparative politics. It fills a gap in knowledge of the reasons why presidential powers expand or contract in the context of the broader strength of democracy." -- L. M. Barnett, Our Lady of the Lake University, CHOICE, "Corrales's theory of power asymmetry resonates with the Latin American experience: constitutions are pacts, and their viability and content depend on the initial balance of forces between the president and the opposition. This book is central to emerging debates about the endogenous nature of institutional design." -Anbal Prez-Lin, University of Notre Dame "Javier Corrales's Fixing Democracy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of constitutionalism, presidentialism, democratization and Latin American politics. Corrales argues that power-diffusing constitutions are an asset for democracies and that they are most likely to emerge when there is a relative symmetry of power between incumbents and the opposition. Constitutions that give presidents great powers can pave the way to democratic erosions; they are most likely when presidents have much more power than oppositions." -Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University "Fixing Democracy is an outstanding book on how the constitutional authority of Latin American presidents expands or is constrained, with major implications for the stability of democratic regimes and the troubling tendency for illiberal backsliding. The book speaks to a large literature on the effects of presidential constitutions in Latin America, but goes well beyond it by showing how constitutions themselves are shaped. Corrales's book is a model of theoretical sophistication and mixed-method empirical research. It will have an important impact on how we think about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and, potentially, other regions as well." - Robert Kaufman, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University "This book is an important contribution to the field of neo-institutionalism in comparative politics. It fills a gap in knowledge of the reasons why presidential powers expand or contract in the context of the broader strength of democracy." -- L. M. Barnett, Our Lady of the Lake University, CHOICE, "Corrales's theory of power asymmetry resonates with the Latin American experience: constitutions are pacts, and their viability and content depend on the initial balance of forces between the president and the opposition. This book is central to emerging debates about the endogenous nature of institutional design." -Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, University of Notre Dame "Javier Corrales's Fixing Democracy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of constitutionalism, presidentialism, democratization and Latin American politics. Corrales argues that power-diffusing constitutions are an asset for democracies and that they are most likely to emerge when there is a relative symmetry of power between incumbents and the opposition. Constitutions that give presidents great powers can pave the way to democratic erosions; they are most likely when presidents have much more power than oppositions." -Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University "Fixing Democracy is an outstanding book on how the constitutional authority of Latin American presidents expands or is constrained, with major implications for the stability of democratic regimes and the troubling tendency for illiberal backsliding. The book speaks to a large literature on the effects of presidential constitutions in Latin America, but goes well beyond it by showing how constitutions themselves are shaped. Corrales's book is a model of theoretical sophistication and mixed-method empirical research. It will have an important impact on how we think about the challenges facing democracy in Latin America and, potentially, other regions as well." - Robert Kaufman, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University
Table Of Content
Part I: The Argument 1. Introduction: Fixing Democracy 2. The Argument: Power Asymmetries, Constitutions, and Presidential Powers Part II: Explaining Constituent Assemblies and Presidential Powers 3. Origins: Rise and Death of Constituent Assemblies in Latin America 4. Content: Constitutional Rewrites and Changes in Presidential Powers Part III: Case Studies 5. Venezuela: Extreme Variations in Power Asymmetries 6. Bolivia: Natural Resources, Demographics, and Reduced Asymmetry 7. Ecuador: When the Opposition Splits Part III: Power Asymmetry and Self-Dealing 8. Term Limits: Self-Dealing, Power Asymmetries, and Changes to Time in Office Part IV: Conclusion 9. Conclusion
Synopsis
In a comprehensive reviews of constitutional change in Latin America, Fixing Democracy argues that the strongest predictor of whether a new constitution will expand or restrict presidential powers is power asymmetry, or more specifically, the distance between Incumbent and Opposition forces at the negotiating table., The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy., The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy , Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.
LC Classification Number
JL961.C67 2018
ebay_catalog_id
4
Copyright Date
2018
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N.º de artículo de eBay:186277551866
Última actualización el 08 jun 2024 18:33:16 H.EspVer todas las actualizacionesVer todas las actualizaciones
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