Product Key Features
Number of Pages448 Pages
Publication NameHarm to Self
LanguageEnglish
SubjectEthics & Moral Philosophy, Criminal Law / General, Jurisprudence
Publication Year1989
FeaturesReprint
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaLaw, Philosophy
AuthorJoel Feinberg
SeriesMoral Limits of the Criminal Law Ser.
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceCollege Audience
Reviews"Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or herfail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct'....[A] first-rate work...of moral philosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] centralplace...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moral connotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times Higher EducationSupplement "Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or herfailto make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct'....[A] first-rate work...of moral philosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moral connotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times Higher Education Supplement "Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or her fail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct?....[A] first-rate work...of moral philosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moral connotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."-- Times Higher Education Supplement "Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or her fail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct'....[A] first-rate work...of moral philosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."-- Ethics, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moralconnotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times Higher Education Supplement"Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or her fail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct?....[A] first-rate work...of moralphilosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics"An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moralconnotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times Higher Education Supplement"Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or her fail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct?....[A] first-rate work...of moralphilosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinbergconvincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moral connotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times HigherEducation Supplement, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moral connotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times Higher Education Supplement "Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or her fail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct'....[A] first-rate work...of moral philosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics, "An admirably lucid attempt to reinvoke and strengthen the liberal core of Mill's theory....[The book's] great merit is to have consistently argued the case against paternalistic legislation in relation to specific areas of legal policy and legislative debate. Not only does Feinberg convincingly make the case that no area of interference into the domain of self-regarding action is trivial...but he also persuasively pursues all the policy implications and moral connotations of the various contemporary legal test cases of the contours of individual privacy."--Times Higher Education Supplement"Because of his focus on the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg develops, with characteristic subtlety and illumination, an account of what he calls failures of consent in two-party cases: when does the consent on the part of the party harmed to the action of another harming him or her fail to make the other's action legally permissible and so justify criminal prohibitions of the other's harmful conduct?....[A] first-rate work...of moral philosophy...contain[s] richly detailed and illuminating discussions of a host of issues concerning paternalism and deserve[s] [a] central place...in the contemporary debate over it."--Ethics
Dewey Edition20
Series Volume NumberVol. 3
IllustratedYes
Volume NumberVol. 3
Dewey Decimal342.5
Edition DescriptionReprint
SynopsisThis is the third volume of Joel Feinberg's highly regarded The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, a four-volume series in which Feinberg skillfully addresses a complex question: What kinds of conduct may the state make criminal without infringing on the moral autonomy of individual citizens? In Harm to Self, Feinberg offers insightful commentary into various notions attached to self-inflicted harm, covering such topics as legal paternalism, personal sovereignty and its boundaries, voluntariness and assumptions of risk, consent and its counterfeits, coercive force, incapacity, and choice of death., This is the third volume of Joel Feinberg's highly regarded The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law , a four-volume series in which Feinberg skillfully addresses a complex question: What kinds of conduct may the state make criminal without infringing on the moral autonomy of individual citizens? In Harm to Self , Feinberg offers insightful commentary into various notions attached to self-inflicted harm, covering such topics as legal paternalism, personal sovereignty and its boundaries, voluntariness and assumptions of risk, consent and its counterfeits, coercive force, incapacity, and choice of death., The Moral Limits of Criminal Law is a four-volume work that answers the question: what kinds of conduct may a legislature make criminal without infringing the moral autonomy of individual citizens? Volume three, 'Harm to Self', tackles the riddles associated with the commonly proposed principle called 'legal Paternalism'. It evaluates (and rejects) the principle that it can be right to impose coercion on a person 'for his own good', whatever his own wishes in the matter. Chapters in this section discuss the concept of personal autonomy (or 'sovereignty'), voluntariness, and assumption of risk, as well as 'failures of consent' because of duress, fraud, and other factors incompatible with voluntary behaviour.
LC Classification NumberK5018