Oops! Looks like we're having trouble connecting to our server.
Refresh your browser window to try again.
Acerca de este artículo
Product Identifiers
PublisherHarvard University Press
ISBN-100674235398
ISBN-139780674235397
eBay Product ID (ePID)195206
Product Key Features
Number of Pages384 Pages
Publication NameEconomic Structure of Corporate Law
LanguageEnglish
SubjectCorporate, General, Corporate Finance / General
Publication Year1996
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaLaw, Business & Economics
AuthorDaniel R. Fischel, Frank H. Easterbrook
FormatTrade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height0.1 in
Item Weight20.1 Oz
Item Length1 in
Item Width0.7 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
ReviewsAn important and provocative contribution to the law and economics literature...Scholars in the field should hold a place for it on their shelves., Truly first-rate...Arguably the most important--and most readable--corporate law book ever. A classic...Certain to change the way corporate law is taught, understood, and possibly even made.
TitleLeadingThe
Dewey Edition20
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal346.73/066
Table Of Content1. The Corporate Contract 2. Limited Liability 3. Voting 4. The Fiduciary Principle, the Business Judgment Rule, and the Derivative Suit 5. Corporate Control Transactions
SynopsisThe authors argue that corporate law's rules and practices mimic contractual provisions that parties would reach if they bargained about every contingency at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides necessary rules and an invaluable enforcement mechanism., The authors argue that the rules and practices of corporate law mimic contractual provisions that parties would reach if they bargained about every contingency at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. But bargaining and enforcement are costly, and corporate law provides the rules and an enforcement mechanism that govern relations among those who commit their capital to such ventures. The authors work out the reasons for supposing that this is the exclusive function of corporate law and the implications of this perspective.